BP-05 · Industry Blueprint · Aviation & Aerospace

Aviation operations depend on connections. Not all need to stay open.

BP-05 Aviation & Aerospace Control Blueprint icon

Airports, airlines and aerospace operators rely on connected operational systems, specialist suppliers and distributed sites. Selected paths can be governed around approved work, subject to safety and continuity review.

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An MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.
Reference design for adaptation with the service owner, not a validated deployment. Confirm complete boundary coverage, operational dependencies and the consequences of opening or closing each selected path.
3 matching Control Plans. Offline Secure Storage® is separate.
Control does not replace operational safety systems, network security controls, incident response, supplier governance or service continuity planning. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

The industry reality

Aviation & Aerospace: the connections your operation relies on.

Aviation and aerospace operations depend on connected systems, specialist suppliers and site infrastructure. A path that is convenient during planned work may also remain available outside that purpose.

Operational interruptionA disrupted aviation and aerospace connection may affect services beyond the intended maintenance or response scope.

Safety dependenciesConnections supporting safe operation of aviation and aerospace assets require careful dependency review before any intervention.

Persistent third-party pathsAn always-available supplier route can extend access beyond the approved task or maintenance window.

Unclear connection stateLogical policy and tickets alone may not show which selected paths were available at a particular point.

What needs protecting

The service, systems and people behind the connections.

An MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.

Shared dependenciesAn airport may host multiple operators and service providers, so a change to one path can affect systems outside its owner’s immediate view.

Safety and availabilityAir traffic, airport and aircraft support functions have distinct safety and continuity requirements that must guide any proposed boundary.

Maintenance accessAircraft, avionics and airport infrastructure suppliers may require access for defined engineering tasks.

Threats and failure scenarios

Situations to plan for, before the next incident.

An MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Scoped support for Aviation & AerospaceAn MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.

Review an affected boundarySeparate the agreed ground-support boundary from other zones; flight-critical and air-traffic services require their own approved assessment.

CP-07: agree the connection and authoritySeparate the agreed ground-support boundary from other zones; flight-critical and air-traffic services require their own approved assessment. Use CP-07 only where its scope and approval requirements fit this connection.

Industry architecture

Illustrative sector connections.

Illustrative sector connection

Stage

Without Control: the selected routes remain open.

Modules in this Blueprint

Shown when the agreed Control response is selected.

An illustrative ransomware event starts in a connected system and follows the open routes shown here. This is a connection model, not a prediction of a real attack.The open connections allow movement in this simplified model. Actual exposure depends on your environment and existing defences.

Selected connection states

MRO supplier to ground engineering systemsAlways connected
Business IT to ground operational systemsAlways connected
Flight-critical or air-traffic service connectionsAlways connected
Ground support to controlled exchange environmentAlways connected
Recovery access (OSS)Disconnected

!Illustrative threat starts at · Corporate IT
+Modelled movement to · Supplier access, Identity
+Modelled movement to · Approved access, Airfield systems
+Modelled movement to · Supporting service, Selected operational links, Airport OT
+Modelled movement to · Protected service, Maintenance

This model only shows the selected routes. An interrupted route does not remove an existing compromise or protect unmodelled paths. Your security tools detect the event; the agreed Control design governs the response. Offline Secure Storage® holds copies separately; it is not a Control module.

Recommended industry Blueprint

Our recommended Blueprint for Aviation & Aerospace.

An MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Start with these connections: MRO supplier to ground engineering systems; Business IT to ground operational systems
Agree how access works: Open only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions
Plan the response: Change only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact

Refine this recommendation with airport or airline operations, mro engineering and security leads. Offline Secure Storage® can hold recovery copies separately; it is not a Control module.

As featured in

Operational scenarios

Who decides, what changes, and what is checked.

Agree responsibility and service dependencies before relying on a controlled connection.

Normal operation
Airports, airlines and aerospace operators rely on connected operational systems, specialist suppliers and distributed sites. Selected paths can be governed around approved work, subject to safety and continuity review.
Approved work
An MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.
Incident response
An MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.
Reconnection
The owner reviews service dependencies and security checks, authorises reconnection and verifies the observed result. Evidence is retained only through the specified supporting systems.

Control does not replace operational safety systems, network security controls, incident response, supplier governance or service continuity planning. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Resilience and recovery

Offline Secure Storage®

OSS protects stored business data, recovery copies and retained evidence through physical disconnection. It is a separate storage service, not a Control module or a network containment function.

Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.

Offline Secure Storage (OSS) is separate from Control. If selected, it can hold retained copies of configurations, records or recovery material. Collection, completeness and recovery readiness depend on the supporting tools, retention design and tested recovery procedures.

Explore Offline Secure Storage

Standards and governance

Support your obligations. Keep the boundaries clear.

Alignment may be assessed against ICAO aviation security guidance and applicable national aviation security requirements; this Blueprint does not imply certification or a compliance outcome. Any assessment needs deployment-specific scope and evidence; this Blueprint provides no certification, complete audit trail or guaranteed response time.

What this addressesAn MRO supplier needs a ground-engineering session without extending access into unrelated operational systems. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

What it does not replaceControl does not replace operational safety systems, network security controls, incident response, supplier governance or service continuity planning. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Evidence agreed for the deploymentSpecify the requests, approvals, commands, observed states and test results to retain. Logging capability and retention depend on the selected design.

Detection and the decision to act belong to the operational owner and supporting security systems. Identity, approval workflow, session expiry and evidence collection require specified integrations. Execute initiates an approved action; Fracture physically disconnects the selected path through Firebreak hardware. Confirm the observed connection state separately. Anchor keeps critical assets within defined physical connection boundaries; it does not collect or retain records. Transfer governs a designated exchange path, not content inspection or de-identification.

Deployment and proof of concept

Start with one boundary. Test it. Then expand.

Review the first selected connection with airport or airline operations, mro engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Map the complete boundary
Confirm cabling, redundant links and alternate routes. A selected physical cut does not remove paths outside its scope.
Agree an independent command route
Confirm the available command methods for the selected hardware. Command delivery can be affected by coverage, roaming and handshakes.
Test the effect, not just the command
Verify the observed link state, service dependencies and failure behaviour in an agreed test window.

Plan your first route

Start with the route you would close first.

Review the first selected connection with airport or airline operations, mro engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Outcomes

What changes, and how you will verify it.

Judge the Blueprint on agreed, observed outcomes.

MRO supplier to ground engineering systemsOpen only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions. Agree identity checks, approval, session closure and observed-state checks

Business IT to ground operational systemsChange only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact. Map alternate routes and preserve services outside the selected scope

Flight-critical or air-traffic service connectionsNot assumed disconnectable. Safety and continuity owners must assess this dependency separately

Questions worth asking

Before you rely on BP-05.

Practical questions for the people who own these connections.

Not by assumption. Map dependencies and agree the acceptable service impact with the operational owner before selecting a path.

Review the first selected connection with airport or airline operations, mro engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Your next step

Take the next step with aviation & aerospace.

Review the first selected connection with airport or airline operations, mro engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

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