BP-08 · Industry Blueprint · Healthcare

Healthcare depends on connected clinical systems. Not all need to stay open.

Hospitals and care providers connect clinical applications, patient records, medical devices and suppliers across complex environments. Control may add physical boundaries to selected paths, with clinical safety and service continuity central to design.

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A medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.
Reference design for adaptation with the service owner, not a validated deployment. Confirm complete boundary coverage, operational dependencies and the consequences of opening or closing each selected path.
3 matching Control Plans. Offline Secure Storage® is separate.
It does not replace clinical governance, medical device safety, existing security controls, care continuity or recovery planning. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

The industry reality

Healthcare: the connections your operation relies on.

Clinical systems depend on communications among electronic patient records, imaging, medical devices, administration and external support providers. Changes to connectivity may affect care delivery and must be considered with clinical owners.

Clinical availabilityA loss of connectivity may affect access to records, imaging or systems used in care.

Device exposureMedical devices may have specific support, monitoring and communications dependencies.

Support accessPersistent vendor paths may extend access to clinical systems beyond planned maintenance.

Service restorationRecovery plans need to account for clinical priorities and validated system dependencies.

What needs protecting

The service, systems and people behind the connections.

A medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.

Standing accessWhich device and application support paths are available outside approved maintenance?

Shared dependenciesWhich shared services support clinical workflows across departments or sites?

Critical availabilityWhich connections must remain available for patient care, monitoring or emergency response?

Threats and failure scenarios

Situations to plan for, before the next incident.

A medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Scoped support for HealthcareA medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.

Review an affected boundaryReview a suspect device maintenance connection with clinical and medical-engineering owners; isolation is not assumed safe for the patient.

CP-14: agree the connection and authorityReview a suspect device maintenance connection with clinical and medical-engineering owners; isolation is not assumed safe for the patient. Use CP-14 only where its scope and approval requirements fit this connection.

Industry architecture

Illustrative sector connections.

Illustrative sector connection

Stage

Without Control: the selected routes remain open.

Modules in this Blueprint

Shown when the agreed Control response is selected.

An illustrative ransomware event starts in a connected system and follows the open routes shown here. This is a connection model, not a prediction of a real attack.The open connections allow movement in this simplified model. Actual exposure depends on your environment and existing defences.

Selected connection states

Medical supplier to device maintenance interfaceAlways connected
Administrative IT to clinical support boundaryAlways connected
Medical device to patient monitoringAlways connected
Research support to clinical exchange brokerAlways connected
Recovery access (OSS)Disconnected

!Illustrative threat starts at · Administrative IT
+Modelled movement to · Supplier access, Identity
+Modelled movement to · Approved access, Clinical systems
+Modelled movement to · Supporting service, Electronic patient records, Medical devices
+Modelled movement to · Protected service, Imaging systems

This model only shows the selected routes. An interrupted route does not remove an existing compromise or protect unmodelled paths. Your security tools detect the event; the agreed Control design governs the response. Offline Secure Storage® holds copies separately; it is not a Control module.

Recommended industry Blueprint

Our recommended Blueprint for Healthcare.

Start with these connections: Medical supplier to device maintenance interface; Administrative IT to clinical support boundary
Agree how access works: Open only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions
Plan the response: Change only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact

Refine this recommendation with clinical service owners, medical engineering and security leads. Offline Secure Storage® can hold recovery copies separately; it is not a Control module.

As featured in

Operational scenarios

Who decides, what changes, and what is checked.

Agree responsibility and service dependencies before relying on a controlled connection.

Normal operation
Hospitals and care providers connect clinical applications, patient records, medical devices and suppliers across complex environments. Control may add physical boundaries to selected paths, with clinical safety and service continuity central to design.
Approved work
A medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.
Incident response
A medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.
Reconnection
The owner reviews service dependencies and security checks, authorises reconnection and verifies the observed result. Evidence is retained only through the specified supporting systems.

It does not replace clinical governance, medical device safety, existing security controls, care continuity or recovery planning. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Resilience and recovery

Offline Secure Storage®

OSS protects stored business data, recovery copies and retained evidence through physical disconnection. It is a separate storage service, not a Control module or a network containment function.

Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.

Offline Secure Storage (OSS) is separate from Control. If selected, it can hold retained copies of configurations, records or recovery material. Collection, completeness and recovery readiness depend on the supporting tools, retention design and tested recovery procedures.

Explore Offline Secure Storage

Standards and governance

Support your obligations. Keep the boundaries clear.

Alignment may be assessed against the NHS Data Security and Protection Toolkit and applicable UK health data requirements; no certification or compliance outcome is implied. Any assessment needs deployment-specific scope and evidence; this Blueprint provides no certification, complete audit trail or guaranteed response time.

What this addressesA medical-device supplier needs maintenance access while clinical staff retain responsibility for patient-care dependencies. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

What it does not replaceIt does not replace clinical governance, medical device safety, existing security controls, care continuity or recovery planning. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Evidence agreed for the deploymentSpecify the requests, approvals, commands, observed states and test results to retain. Logging capability and retention depend on the selected design.

Detection and the decision to act belong to the operational owner and supporting security systems. Identity, approval workflow, session expiry and evidence collection require specified integrations. Execute initiates an approved action; Fracture physically disconnects the selected path through Firebreak hardware. Confirm the observed connection state separately. Anchor keeps critical assets within defined physical connection boundaries; it does not collect or retain records. Transfer governs a designated exchange path, not content inspection or de-identification.

Deployment and proof of concept

Start with one boundary. Test it. Then expand.

Review the first selected connection with clinical service owners, medical engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Map the complete boundary
Confirm cabling, redundant links and alternate routes. A selected physical cut does not remove paths outside its scope.
Agree an independent command route
Confirm the available command methods for the selected hardware. Command delivery can be affected by coverage, roaming and handshakes.
Test the effect, not just the command
Verify the observed link state, service dependencies and failure behaviour in an agreed test window.

Plan your first route

Start with the route you would close first.

Review the first selected connection with clinical service owners, medical engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Outcomes

What changes, and how you will verify it.

Judge the Blueprint on agreed, observed outcomes.

Medical supplier to device maintenance interfaceOpen only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions. Agree identity checks, approval, session closure and observed-state checks

Administrative IT to clinical support boundaryChange only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact. Map alternate routes and preserve services outside the selected scope

Medical device to patient monitoringNot assumed disconnectable. Safety and continuity owners must assess this dependency separately

Questions worth asking

Before you rely on BP-08.

Practical questions for the people who own these connections.

Not by assumption. Map dependencies and agree the acceptable service impact with the operational owner before selecting a path.

Review the first selected connection with clinical service owners, medical engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Your next step

Take the next step with healthcare.

Review the first selected connection with clinical service owners, medical engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

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