Control PlanCP-14Compromised Device Isolation
Proposed Control Plan. Subject to technical and publication approval.
One affected device. A defined physical boundary.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network.
- Plan
- CP-14
- Purpose
- Compromised Device Isolation
- Selected connections
- 6
- Modules
- Fracture · Isolate · Execute · Validate · Unlink · Lock
- Scope
- One identified endpoint or appliance and its mapped physical connections. Segment-wide effects require explicit approval.
What is at stake
Why compromised device isolation matters.
A compromised endpoint can retain network reach while responders investigate.
The problem today
Where you are IP connected today.
CP-14 reviews six IP-connected paths in your business. While a path stays connected over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited. Each path below carries its own risk to agree with its owner.
- Risk 1Device primary Ethernet interface to access switch
Whenever this path is open over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited.
Agreed state: Connected
- Risk 2Device secondary Ethernet interface to network
Whenever this path is open over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited.
Agreed state: Connected
- Risk 3Admin gateway to device management interface
Whenever this path is open over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited.
Agreed state: Disconnected
- Risk 4Shared device gateway to business service network
Whenever this path is open over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited.
Agreed state: Connected
- Risk 5Responder staging network to evidence workstation
Whenever this path is open over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited.
Agreed state: Disconnected
- Risk 6Device dock Ethernet interface to access switch
Whenever this path is open over IP, it is a route that can be reached, misused or exploited.
Agreed state: Connected
Matching industry Blueprints
BP-08 · healthcareWhat Firevault changes
What changes with this Plan.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries.
| Connection | Agreed normal state | Control action |
|---|---|---|
| Device primary Ethernet interface to access switch | Connected | Fracture withdraws the affected device connection. |
| Device secondary Ethernet interface to network | Connected | Isolate operates the registered device interfaces as one group. |
| Admin gateway to device management interface | Disconnected | Execute closes the device management connection. |
| Shared device gateway to business service network | Connected | Fracture withdraws the shared device service boundary. |
| Responder staging network to evidence workstation | Disconnected | Transfer governs responder artefacts; Execute closes the evidence crossing. |
| Device dock Ethernet interface to access switch | Connected | Isolate withdraws the dock path with other registered device conduits. |
Threat detection, malware removal and independent wireless, cellular or cloud routes unless separately addressed.
Control in Action
Compromised Device Isolation: see the selected path change.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries.
Control in Action
Stage
Before agreed physical control
A compromised endpoint can retain network reach while responders investigate.Connected routes require review. Discovery checks your real dependencies.
Physical crossings
- Device primary Ethernet interface to access switchAlways connected
- Device secondary Ethernet interface to networkAlways connected
- Admin gateway to device management interfaceAlways connected
- Shared device gateway to business service networkAlways connected
- Recovery access (OSS)Not in place
- FBFracture · Review the purpose and ownership of each selected connection.
Illustrative selected connections, not an approved deployment. Agree service dependencies and authorised actions before implementation. This illustration does not predict attack reach or service availability. Offline Secure Storage® remains separate.
The modules involved
The Control modules behind this Plan.
In CP-14: withdraws the identified device crossing. In CP-14: groups the affected device boundaries where the design requires it. In CP-14: applies the approved device containment or return action.
CP-14Compromised Device Isolation
This Control Plan
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries.
Primary modules: Fracture, Isolate, Execute, Validate, Unlink and Lock.
Read the operational detailModule in this plan
Fracture
Physically disconnects network paths to prevent unauthorised access, contain threats and stop an attack from progressing.
Physically disconnects network paths to prevent unauthorised access, contain threats and stop an attack from progressing.
Explore the Fracture moduleConcept illustration. Select any module to see what it does. Placement is drawn from your own network in discovery.
Control Plans that work alongside CP-14
CP-13 · ProposedMaintenance Window ControlConnections that exist only for a scheduled maintenance window.Open CP-13
CP-15 · ProposedOperational Technology ProtectionIndustrial controllers behind a physical network boundary.Open CP-15
CP-12 · ProposedPrivileged Access ControlAdministrator access through a controlled network entry point.Open CP-12The Control Plan specification
Each selected connection, written down.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries.
Device primary Ethernet interface to access switchConnected
- Normal state
- Connected
- Authorisation
- 1 · Approved endpoint alert identifies this device as compromised
- Module action
- Fracture withdraws the affected device connection.
- Business effect
- Device access to shared applications and network storage stops.
- Failure behaviour
- Disconnected on fault; the device remains without its primary network path.
Device secondary Ethernet interface to networkConnected
- Normal state
- Connected
- Authorisation
- 1 · The same validated device alert requires all wired paths withdrawn
- Module action
- Isolate operates the registered device interfaces as one group.
- Business effect
- Secondary wired access stops, preventing this route from retaining connectivity.
- Failure behaviour
- Disconnected on power loss; verify secondary port state independently.
Admin gateway to device management interfaceDisconnected
- Normal state
- Disconnected
- Authorisation
- 1 · Device compromise alert invalidates the approved management session
- Module action
- Execute closes the device management connection.
- Business effect
- Remote administration stops; local responder access remains separately scoped.
- Failure behaviour
- Disconnected on fault; use the approved local response procedure.
Shared device gateway to business service networkConnected
- Normal state
- Connected
- Authorisation
- 2 · Incident owner accepts shared service impact after device compromise
- Module action
- Fracture withdraws the shared device service boundary.
- Business effect
- All users lose the shared device service, not just the affected session.
- Failure behaviour
- Designed to stay connected on fault; shared service availability leaves residual exposure.
Responder staging network to evidence workstationDisconnected
- Normal state
- Disconnected
- Authorisation
- 1 · Approved evidence collection completes or collection authority is withdrawn
- Module action
- Transfer governs responder artefacts; Execute closes the evidence crossing.
- Business effect
- Remote evidence collection stops; already collected artefacts remain.
- Failure behaviour
- Disconnected on fault; verify evidence completeness before resuming collection.
Device dock Ethernet interface to access switchConnected
- Normal state
- Connected
- Authorisation
- 1 · Validated device alert includes the registered dock interface
- Module action
- Isolate withdraws the dock path with other registered device conduits.
- Business effect
- Dock network services stop; unrelated dock peripherals are outside scope.
- Failure behaviour
- Disconnected on power loss; check other adapters before declaring isolation.
Threat detection, malware removal and independent wireless, cellular or cloud routes unless separately addressed.
Operational runbook
Who does what, and when.
What happens under normal conditions, during approved work, when an incident is detected and when connections are restored.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries. Each selected connection sits at its agreed normal state.
Set in the Plan, signed off by your operational, security and continuity leads.
Connection states, continuously.
Fracture withdraws the affected device connection.
Validate
Unlink
Lock
The named owner approves each opening in advance.
Request, approval, opening and closure.
Your security tools raise an alert. The agreed action starts out of band, without depending on the network under attack.
Execute
Pre-authorised in the Plan. The incident owner is told at once.
The alert and the action taken.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries.
Fracture
Isolate
Automatic only for the crossings you agreed. Anything else needs the incident owner.
Each action, timestamped.
A physical boundary does not prove task completion or device remediation. Apply the agreed evidence and owner checks.
The operational owner authorises each reconnection.
Each check and each reconnection.
Threat detection, malware removal and independent wireless, cellular or cloud routes unless separately addressed.
Engineering and integration
Fit the control around your existing environment.
One identified endpoint or appliance and its mapped physical connections. Segment-wide effects require explicit approval.
Testing and evidence
Prove the selected connection before relying on it.
Agree acceptance criteria with the service owner, then retain the observed results.
Resilience and recovery
Offline Secure Storage®
OSS protects stored business data, recovery copies and retained evidence through physical disconnection. It is a separate storage service, not a Control module or a network containment function.
Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.
A physical boundary does not prove task completion or device remediation. Apply the agreed evidence and owner checks.
Explore Offline Secure StorageFrameworks and limitations
Support your obligations. Keep the boundaries clear.
Threat detection, malware removal and independent wireless, cellular or cloud routes unless separately addressed.
Build your Control Plan
Start with the connections you would cut first.
Use these proposed entries to prepare a discovery discussion. Identify connection owners, alternatives, approved states and unresolved dependencies. Selections are not deployment instructions.
Questions worth asking
Before you rely on CP-14.
Practical questions for the people who own these connections.
Physically isolate one affected device from the network at its identified boundaries.
One identified endpoint or appliance and its mapped physical connections. Segment-wide effects require explicit approval.
Not by assumption. Map dependencies and agree the acceptable service impact with the operational owner before selecting a path.
Threat detection, malware removal and independent wireless, cellular or cloud routes unless separately addressed.
Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.
Use these proposed entries to prepare a discovery discussion. Identify connection owners, alternatives, approved states and unresolved dependencies. Selections are not deployment instructions.
Your next step
Take the next step with compromised device isolation.
Use these proposed entries to prepare a discovery discussion. Identify connection owners, alternatives, approved states and unresolved dependencies. Selections are not deployment instructions.
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