BP-03 · Industry Blueprint · Oil & Gas

Oil and gas operations depend on connections. Not all need to stay open.

Oil and gas operations connect DCS, SCADA, safety instrumented systems, remote wellheads, offshore platforms and pipelines. A reference design can help operators review selected paths without assuming every operational connection can be interrupted.

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An OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.
Reference design for adaptation with the service owner, not a validated deployment. Confirm complete boundary coverage, operational dependencies and the consequences of opening or closing each selected path.
3 matching Control Plans. Offline Secure Storage® is separate.
It does not replace sector-specific safety engineering, operational procedures, monitoring or regulatory obligations. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

The industry reality

Oil & Gas: the connections your operation relies on.

Facility-specific boundaries should be agreed by operations, process safety and engineering teams. Contractor routes and satellite or radio communications may connect remote sites to process environments.

ContinuityA change to a selected path may affect service, visibility or coordination.

Cross-zone routesCorporate and supplier connections should be mapped against operational dependencies.

CommunicationsRemote links may support essential monitoring or control functions.

Configuration readinessSelected configurations and recovery dependencies merit review.

What needs protecting

The service, systems and people behind the connections.

An OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.

Supplier routesAre support paths available only for approved work?

Remote dependenciesWhich services rely on each site communications route?

Safe responseWhat operational response applies if a selected link is interrupted?

Threats and failure scenarios

Situations to plan for, before the next incident.

An OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Scoped support for Oil & GasAn OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.

Review an affected boundaryAssess a suspect engineering route separately from safety instrumented functions and process-control dependencies.

CP-04: agree the connection and authorityAssess a suspect engineering route separately from safety instrumented functions and process-control dependencies. Use CP-04 only where its scope and approval requirements fit this connection.

Industry architecture

Illustrative sector connections.

Illustrative sector connection

Stage

Without Control: the selected routes remain open.

Modules in this Blueprint

Shown when the agreed Control response is selected.

An illustrative ransomware event starts in a connected system and follows the open routes shown here. This is a connection model, not a prediction of a real attack.The open connections allow movement in this simplified model. Actual exposure depends on your environment and existing defences.

Selected connection states

OEM support to DCS engineeringAlways connected
Corporate reporting to process historianAlways connected
Safety instrumented system to process equipmentAlways connected
Pipeline telemetry to operations centreAlways connected
Recovery access (OSS)Disconnected

!Illustrative threat starts at · Corporate IT
+Modelled movement to · Supplier access, Identity
+Modelled movement to · Approved access, Control systems
+Modelled movement to · Supporting service, SCADA and DCS, Remote sites
+Modelled movement to · Protected service, Field assets

This model only shows the selected routes. An interrupted route does not remove an existing compromise or protect unmodelled paths. Your security tools detect the event; the agreed Control design governs the response. Offline Secure Storage® holds copies separately; it is not a Control module.

Recommended industry Blueprint

Our recommended Blueprint for Oil & Gas.

An OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Start with these connections: OEM support to DCS engineering; Corporate reporting to process historian
Agree how access works: Open only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions
Plan the response: Change only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact

Refine this recommendation with process operations, instrumentation engineering and security leads. Offline Secure Storage® can hold recovery copies separately; it is not a Control module.

As featured in

Operational scenarios

Who decides, what changes, and what is checked.

Agree responsibility and service dependencies before relying on a controlled connection.

Normal operation
Oil and gas operations connect DCS, SCADA, safety instrumented systems, remote wellheads, offshore platforms and pipelines. A reference design can help operators review selected paths without assuming every operational connection can be interrupted.
Approved work
An OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.
Incident response
An OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.
Reconnection
The owner reviews service dependencies and security checks, authorises reconnection and verifies the observed result. Evidence is retained only through the specified supporting systems.

It does not replace sector-specific safety engineering, operational procedures, monitoring or regulatory obligations. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Resilience and recovery

Offline Secure Storage®

OSS protects stored business data, recovery copies and retained evidence through physical disconnection. It is a separate storage service, not a Control module or a network containment function.

Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.

Offline Secure Storage (OSS) is separate from Control. If selected, it can hold retained copies of configurations, records or recovery material. Collection, completeness and recovery readiness depend on the supporting tools, retention design and tested recovery procedures.

Explore Offline Secure Storage

Standards and governance

Support your obligations. Keep the boundaries clear.

Alignment may be assessed against IEC 62443 zone and conduit concepts; no certification or compliance outcome is implied. Any assessment needs deployment-specific scope and evidence; this Blueprint provides no certification, complete audit trail or guaranteed response time.

What this addressesAn OEM needs to support a DCS engineering workstation during an agreed maintenance task. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

What it does not replaceIt does not replace sector-specific safety engineering, operational procedures, monitoring or regulatory obligations. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Evidence agreed for the deploymentSpecify the requests, approvals, commands, observed states and test results to retain. Logging capability and retention depend on the selected design.

Detection and the decision to act belong to the operational owner and supporting security systems. Identity, approval workflow, session expiry and evidence collection require specified integrations. Execute initiates an approved action; Fracture physically disconnects the selected path through Firebreak hardware. Confirm the observed connection state separately. Anchor keeps critical assets within defined physical connection boundaries; it does not collect or retain records. Transfer governs a designated exchange path, not content inspection or de-identification.

Deployment and proof of concept

Start with one boundary. Test it. Then expand.

Review the first selected connection with process operations, instrumentation engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Map the complete boundary
Confirm cabling, redundant links and alternate routes. A selected physical cut does not remove paths outside its scope.
Agree an independent command route
Confirm the available command methods for the selected hardware. Command delivery can be affected by coverage, roaming and handshakes.
Test the effect, not just the command
Verify the observed link state, service dependencies and failure behaviour in an agreed test window.

Plan your first route

Start with the route you would close first.

Review the first selected connection with process operations, instrumentation engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Outcomes

What changes, and how you will verify it.

Judge the Blueprint on agreed, observed outcomes.

OEM support to DCS engineeringOpen only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions. Agree identity checks, approval, session closure and observed-state checks

Corporate reporting to process historianChange only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact. Map alternate routes and preserve services outside the selected scope

Safety instrumented system to process equipmentNot assumed disconnectable. Safety and continuity owners must assess this dependency separately

Questions worth asking

Before you rely on BP-03.

Practical questions for the people who own these connections.

Not by assumption. Map dependencies and agree the acceptable service impact with the operational owner before selecting a path.

Review the first selected connection with process operations, instrumentation engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Your next step

Take the next step with oil & gas.

Review the first selected connection with process operations, instrumentation engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

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