BP-17 · Industry Blueprint · Retail

Retail operations depend on connected systems. Not all need to stay open.

Retailers connect payment terminals, store systems, fulfilment, suppliers and central services across distributed estates. Control may add physical boundaries to selected paths, taking payment operations and store continuity into account.

Book a briefing Explore the Control Plans

A support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.
Reference design for adaptation with the service owner, not a validated deployment. Confirm complete boundary coverage, operational dependencies and the consequences of opening or closing each selected path.
3 matching Control Plans. Offline Secure Storage® is separate.
It does not replace payment security controls, PCI DSS assessment, store resilience, endpoint security or incident response. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

The industry reality

Retail: the connections your operation relies on.

Store environments may connect point-of-sale systems, back-office services, CCTV, guest networks and payment processors. A compromised route may create risks across payment data, customer services and multiple locations.

Transaction continuityA connection issue may affect card payments or other checkout services.

Distributed exposureShared services and supplier routes may link many locations to central environments.

Customer informationCompromise of store systems may expose payment or loyalty-related information.

Store availabilityDisruption to back-office or fulfilment systems may affect local operations.

What needs protecting

The service, systems and people behind the connections.

A support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.

Standing accessWhich supplier routes to POS or store systems remain available outside approved maintenance?

Shared dependenciesWhich central services or links are common across locations and network zones?

Critical availabilityWhich connections are essential for payment processing or safe store operations?

Threats and failure scenarios

Situations to plan for, before the next incident.

A support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Scoped support for RetailA support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.

Review an affected boundaryReview a selected store-management connection; payment processing, stock systems and alternate site links require a service-impact assessment.

CP-16: agree the connection and authorityReview a selected store-management connection; payment processing, stock systems and alternate site links require a service-impact assessment. Use CP-16 only where its scope and approval requirements fit this connection.

Industry architecture

Illustrative sector connections.

Illustrative sector connection

Stage

Without Control: the selected routes remain open.

Modules in this Blueprint

Shown when the agreed Control response is selected.

An illustrative ransomware event starts in a connected system and follows the open routes shown here. This is a connection model, not a prediction of a real attack.The open connections allow movement in this simplified model. Actual exposure depends on your environment and existing defences.

Selected connection states

Support supplier to POS administrationAlways connected
Guest or store network to payment administrationAlways connected
POS service to payment processorAlways connected
Store support to central managementAlways connected
Recovery access (OSS)Disconnected

!Illustrative threat starts at · Corporate IT
+Modelled movement to · Supplier access, Identity
+Modelled movement to · Approved access, POS systems
+Modelled movement to · Supporting service, Checkout / payment, Back office
+Modelled movement to · Protected service, CCTV systems

This model only shows the selected routes. An interrupted route does not remove an existing compromise or protect unmodelled paths. Your security tools detect the event; the agreed Control design governs the response. Offline Secure Storage® holds copies separately; it is not a Control module.

Recommended industry Blueprint

Our recommended Blueprint for Retail.

Start with these connections: Support supplier to POS administration; Guest or store network to payment administration
Agree how access works: Open only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions
Plan the response: Change only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact

Refine this recommendation with store operations, payment service owners and security leads. Offline Secure Storage® can hold recovery copies separately; it is not a Control module.

As featured in

Operational scenarios

Who decides, what changes, and what is checked.

Agree responsibility and service dependencies before relying on a controlled connection.

Normal operation
Retailers connect payment terminals, store systems, fulfilment, suppliers and central services across distributed estates. Control may add physical boundaries to selected paths, taking payment operations and store continuity into account.
Approved work
A support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.
Incident response
A support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.
Reconnection
The owner reviews service dependencies and security checks, authorises reconnection and verifies the observed result. Evidence is retained only through the specified supporting systems.

It does not replace payment security controls, PCI DSS assessment, store resilience, endpoint security or incident response. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Resilience and recovery

Offline Secure Storage®

OSS protects stored business data, recovery copies and retained evidence through physical disconnection. It is a separate storage service, not a Control module or a network containment function.

Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.

Offline Secure Storage (OSS) is separate from Control. If selected, it can hold retained copies of configurations, records or recovery material. Collection, completeness and recovery readiness depend on the supporting tools, retention design and tested recovery procedures.

Explore Offline Secure Storage

Standards and governance

Support your obligations. Keep the boundaries clear.

Alignment may be assessed against PCI DSS v4.0.1 where applicable; no certification or compliance outcome is implied. Any assessment needs deployment-specific scope and evidence; this Blueprint provides no certification, complete audit trail or guaranteed response time.

What this addressesA support supplier needs a POS administration session at one store rather than unrestricted access across the estate. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

What it does not replaceIt does not replace payment security controls, PCI DSS assessment, store resilience, endpoint security or incident response. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Evidence agreed for the deploymentSpecify the requests, approvals, commands, observed states and test results to retain. Logging capability and retention depend on the selected design.

Detection and the decision to act belong to the operational owner and supporting security systems. Identity, approval workflow, session expiry and evidence collection require specified integrations. Execute initiates an approved action; Fracture physically disconnects the selected path through Firebreak hardware. Confirm the observed connection state separately. Anchor keeps critical assets within defined physical connection boundaries; it does not collect or retain records. Transfer governs a designated exchange path, not content inspection or de-identification.

Deployment and proof of concept

Start with one boundary. Test it. Then expand.

Review the first selected connection with store operations, payment service owners and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Map the complete boundary
Confirm cabling, redundant links and alternate routes. A selected physical cut does not remove paths outside its scope.
Agree an independent command route
Confirm the available command methods for the selected hardware. Command delivery can be affected by coverage, roaming and handshakes.
Test the effect, not just the command
Verify the observed link state, service dependencies and failure behaviour in an agreed test window.

Plan your first route

Start with the route you would close first.

Review the first selected connection with store operations, payment service owners and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Outcomes

What changes, and how you will verify it.

Judge the Blueprint on agreed, observed outcomes.

Support supplier to POS administrationOpen only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions. Agree identity checks, approval, session closure and observed-state checks

Guest or store network to payment administrationChange only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact. Map alternate routes and preserve services outside the selected scope

POS service to payment processorNot assumed disconnectable. Safety and continuity owners must assess this dependency separately

Questions worth asking

Before you rely on BP-17.

Practical questions for the people who own these connections.

Not by assumption. Map dependencies and agree the acceptable service impact with the operational owner before selecting a path.

Review the first selected connection with store operations, payment service owners and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Your next step

Take the next step with retail.

Review the first selected connection with store operations, payment service owners and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Book a briefing

Prefer to talk first? Speak to the team

Book a briefing Speak to the team