BP-14 · Industry Blueprint · Critical Infrastructure

Essential services depend on connections. Not all need to stay open.

BP-14 Critical Infrastructure Control Blueprint icon

Critical infrastructure relies on operational technology, supervisory systems and supplier connections to deliver essential services. Control introduces physical control at selected network boundaries, subject to operational and safety assessment.

Book a briefing Explore the Control Plans

A specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.
Reference design for adaptation with the service owner, not a validated deployment. Confirm complete boundary coverage, operational dependencies and the consequences of opening or closing each selected path.
3 matching Control Plans. Offline Secure Storage® is separate.
Control does not replace process safety, OT engineering, incident response, monitoring or existing protective measures. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

The industry reality

Critical Infrastructure: the connections your operation relies on.

Connections between business systems, suppliers and operational environments may create dependencies that matter during an incident. Legacy equipment and service continuity requirements can constrain how boundaries are designed.

ContinuityLoss of operational visibility or communications may complicate service delivery.

Supplier exposureMaintenance paths may remain available beyond the work for which they were approved.

Legacy dependenciesOlder systems may rely on specific network paths that are difficult to change.

Recovery readinessTeams need an agreed approach to intervention and restoration of designated connections.

What needs protecting

The service, systems and people behind the connections.

A specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. Review the named support and cross-zone boundaries; operationally required links are not assumed disconnectable.

Standing accessWhich supplier and management connections remain available outside authorised work?

Shared dependenciesWhich business or communications services are relied on by operational systems?

Essential availabilityWhich paths must remain available for safe operation, monitoring or emergency response?

Threats and failure scenarios

Situations to plan for, before the next incident.

A specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Scoped support for Critical InfrastructureA specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.

Review an affected boundaryAssess a selected remote-asset support route against essential service dependencies, alternate communications and the operational authority.

CP-16: agree the connection and authorityAssess a selected remote-asset support route against essential service dependencies, alternate communications and the operational authority. Use CP-16 only where its scope and approval requirements fit this connection.

Industry architecture

Illustrative sector connections.

Illustrative sector connection

Stage

Without Control: the selected routes remain open.

Modules in this Blueprint

Shown when the agreed Control response is selected.

An illustrative ransomware event starts in a connected system and follows the open routes shown here. This is a connection model, not a prediction of a real attack.The open connections allow movement in this simplified model. Actual exposure depends on your environment and existing defences.

Selected connection states

Specialist supplier to OT engineering supportAlways connected
Corporate IT to operational support brokerAlways connected
Controller to essential process functionsAlways connected
Remote asset support to operations centreAlways connected
Recovery access (OSS)Disconnected

!Illustrative threat starts at · Corporate IT
+Modelled movement to · Suppliers, Identity
+Modelled movement to · Approved access, Engineering
+Modelled movement to · Supporting service, Approved workstations, SCADA
+Modelled movement to · Protected service, Controllers

This model only shows the selected routes. An interrupted route does not remove an existing compromise or protect unmodelled paths. Your security tools detect the event; the agreed Control design governs the response. Offline Secure Storage® holds copies separately; it is not a Control module.

Recommended industry Blueprint

Our recommended Blueprint for Critical Infrastructure.

A specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

Start with these connections: Specialist supplier to OT engineering support; Corporate IT to operational support broker
Agree how access works: Open only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions
Plan the response: Change only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact

Refine this recommendation with critical service owners, operational engineering and security leads. Offline Secure Storage® can hold recovery copies separately; it is not a Control module.

As featured in

Operational scenarios

Who decides, what changes, and what is checked.

Agree responsibility and service dependencies before relying on a controlled connection.

Normal operation
Critical infrastructure relies on operational technology, supervisory systems and supplier connections to deliver essential services. Control introduces physical control at selected network boundaries, subject to operational and safety assessment.
Approved work
A specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. The owner authorises the selected route and its closing conditions.
Incident response
A specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.
Reconnection
The owner reviews service dependencies and security checks, authorises reconnection and verifies the observed result. Evidence is retained only through the specified supporting systems.

Control does not replace process safety, OT engineering, incident response, monitoring or existing protective measures. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Resilience and recovery

Offline Secure Storage®

OSS protects stored business data, recovery copies and retained evidence through physical disconnection. It is a separate storage service, not a Control module or a network containment function.

Control by Firevault governs selected physical connections. Existing detection tools and authorised operators decide when to act. OSS does not detect incidents, command Control or replace operational safety procedures.

Offline Secure Storage (OSS) is separate from Control. If selected, it can hold retained copies of configurations, records or recovery material. Collection, completeness and recovery readiness depend on the supporting tools, retention design and tested recovery procedures.

Explore Offline Secure Storage

Standards and governance

Support your obligations. Keep the boundaries clear.

Alignment may be assessed against the NCSC Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) for relevant UK operators; no certification or compliance outcome is implied. Any assessment needs deployment-specific scope and evidence; this Blueprint provides no certification, complete audit trail or guaranteed response time.

What this addressesA specialist supplier needs an engineering-support connection to a named operational asset. Control acts on selected physical connections, not every connection in the environment.

What it does not replaceControl does not replace process safety, OT engineering, incident response, monitoring or existing protective measures. Changing connectivity does not establish a safe process state, stop local execution or guarantee service restoration.

Evidence agreed for the deploymentSpecify the requests, approvals, commands, observed states and test results to retain. Logging capability and retention depend on the selected design.

Detection and the decision to act belong to the operational owner and supporting security systems. Identity, approval workflow, session expiry and evidence collection require specified integrations. Execute initiates an approved action; Fracture physically disconnects the selected path through Firebreak hardware. Confirm the observed connection state separately. Anchor keeps critical assets within defined physical connection boundaries; it does not collect or retain records. Transfer governs a designated exchange path, not content inspection or de-identification.

Deployment and proof of concept

Start with one boundary. Test it. Then expand.

Review the first selected connection with critical service owners, operational engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Map the complete boundary
Confirm cabling, redundant links and alternate routes. A selected physical cut does not remove paths outside its scope.
Agree an independent command route
Confirm the available command methods for the selected hardware. Command delivery can be affected by coverage, roaming and handshakes.
Test the effect, not just the command
Verify the observed link state, service dependencies and failure behaviour in an agreed test window.

Plan your first route

Start with the route you would close first.

Review the first selected connection with critical service owners, operational engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Outcomes

What changes, and how you will verify it.

Judge the Blueprint on agreed, observed outcomes.

Specialist supplier to OT engineering supportOpen only for the authorised support task; close under agreed completion conditions. Agree identity checks, approval, session closure and observed-state checks

Corporate IT to operational support brokerChange only the selected boundary after the service owner approves the impact. Map alternate routes and preserve services outside the selected scope

Controller to essential process functionsNot assumed disconnectable. Safety and continuity owners must assess this dependency separately

Questions worth asking

Before you rely on BP-14.

Practical questions for the people who own these connections.

Not by assumption. Map dependencies and agree the acceptable service impact with the operational owner before selecting a path.

Review the first selected connection with critical service owners, operational engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Your next step

Take the next step with critical infrastructure.

Review the first selected connection with critical service owners, operational engineering and security leads, agree who can authorise a change and test the service impact.

Book a briefing

Prefer to talk first? Speak to the team

Book a briefing Speak to the team