The backup server stays on the network
An always-reachable appliance is always a target. Segregation lowers the odds without removing the path.
Compliance · NCSC on-premises backups
How Firevault maps to the NCSC principles for ransomware-resistant on-premises backups, principle by principle.
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The requirement
NCSC observes that attackers often go after backups early in a destructive attack. Its principles set out what a backup solution must do before it can be considered resistant to destruction.
A backup solution should resist destruction by an attacker with production rights, so recovery does not depend on what the attacker left behind.
This is a mapping, not a certification claim. Confirm current Cyber Essentials Plus status, scope and validity with Firevault. Everything else on this page is alignment, with evidence you can use in your own assessment.

What is tested
Each line is something an assessor, regulator or underwriter can ask you to evidence.
Isolation that an attacker in production cannot undo.
Unpatched backup software is an entry point.
A copy that survives an attacker with production rights.
Restoration is possible even if later versions are corrupted.
Keys for data at rest are protected and held apart.
Alerts fire when privileged actions are attempted.
Where it falls short
The gaps the principles are written to close.
An always-reachable appliance is always a target. Segregation lowers the odds without removing the path.
If backup admin shares a directory with production, one privileged compromise exposes both data and keys.
Short retention or replicated corruption removes the clean earlier states that recovery from long dwell-time attacks depends on.
Hardened repositories and object lock can still be reached over an API.
The architecture
Built around the same threat model: physical disconnection, a separate management plane, encryption and audited restore.
The offline gold copy has no network interface or address. Connection is a scheduled, identity-verified event.
Updates happen in controlled windows, and the attack surface stays small while offline.
Production, domain and hypervisor credentials grant no rights on the offline copy.
Multiple point-in-time copies stay offline, and restores are checksum-verified.
Encryption uses customer-held identity factors, managed separately from the protected systems.
Connections, identity checks, privileged actions and restores are logged, alerted and packaged as evidence.
An on-premises backup that still answers on the network is still in scope for the attack.
What sits offline
The records most often moved into Offline Secure Storage® for this framework.
Authoritative sources
NCSC
The six principles this page maps to.
Read the collection
NCSC
Why at least one backup should be offline and separate from the network it protects.
Read the NCSC blogWe will map Offline Secure Storage® to the outcomes your assessor is checking, with wording and evidence you can submit. From £360 a month including VAT. 36-month commitment.