Destructive actions reach backups
An attacker inside production can reach any target that still has a network interface.
Compliance · NCSC ransomware-resistant backups
Firevault’s mapping to the NCSC principles for backups that survive a destructive attack, with an architectural answer for each.
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The requirement
NCSC publishes its principles and its offline backups guidance for free. Attackers go after backups early, because a backup they can reach is a backup they can destroy.
A backup should survive an attacker who has already reached production, and still give you a way back.
This is a mapping, not a certification claim. Firevault holds Cyber Essentials Plus. Everything else on this page is alignment, with evidence you can use in your own assessment.

What is tested
Each line is something an assessor, regulator or underwriter can ask you to evidence.
Backups should withstand an attacker who has reached production.
Customers keep access to their own data, whatever happens to an account.
A restore remains possible from a copy kept apart from everything else.
Access to backups is clearly separate from day-to-day actions.
Backups are tested so restores are known to work.
Where online backup falls short
The gaps the principles are written to close.
An attacker inside production can reach any target that still has a network interface.
Cloud backup consoles can be locked out, suspended over billing or abused through the identity layer.
If restores use everyday credentials, an intruder inherits the route.
Immutable buckets stay reachable through the provider API and rely on software policy.
The architecture
Offline Secure Storage® is built around the same threat model: physical disconnection, a separate management plane and audited restore.
The gold copy sits on hardware physically disconnected at Layer 1.
A separate management plane and customer-held identity factors.
The copy stays offline in a Firevault Bunker and comes online only within an identity-verified window.
Access needs a scheduled physical connection, separate identity and out-of-band approval.
Recurring windows bring the copy online, verify checksums, partially restore and log each event.
Connections, identity checks and restores are recorded for regulators, insurers and boards.
A destructive action on production has no route to a copy that has no network interface.
What sits offline
The records most often moved into Offline Secure Storage® for this framework.
Mapped to the offline rules
Four published rules, paraphrased, each paired with Firevault’s answer.
| NCSC rule | Modules | Firevault’s answer |
|---|---|---|
| The offline ruleIs one or more backup offline at any given time? |
|
The offline state is automated at Layer 1, with no active interface between identity-verified connection windows. |
| The recovery ruleAre backups restorable and recoverable? |
|
Controlled restore windows allow authorised recovery, with every event logged. |
| The 3-2-1 ruleIs critical data stored in more than one place? |
|
Firevault adds a genuinely offline copy of last resort, held in a Firevault Bunker. |
| The regular ruleIs critical data backed up regularly? |
|
Recurring verification windows test the copy and log each event. |
NCSC does not certify or endorse suppliers. Firevault provides connection, verification and restore evidence so you can make your own case.
Authoritative sources
NCSC
Why at least one backup should be offline and separate from the network it protects.
Read the NCSC blog
NCSC
The five principles this page maps to.
Read the principles
NCSC
NCSC guidance on defending against, and recovering from, ransomware.
Read the guidanceWe will map Offline Secure Storage® to the outcomes your assessor is checking, with wording and evidence you can submit. From £360 a month including VAT. 36-month commitment.