Control for critical infrastructure

National-grade security for essential services.

State-sponsored actors, hacktivists and criminal organisations increasingly target essential services. Software controls alone struggle to address these persistent, sophisticated threats.

• Supply chain attacks
• IT/OT convergence
• Legacy infrastructure

The scenario

Scenario: nation-state attack on an energy grid.

The air gap was assumed to be real. It was a firewall rule, and when it failed, everything behind it was exposed. Step through it, or play it through.

1. 01The attack path
2. 02With Control

Step 1 of 2

The attack path

A state-sponsored group compromises a regional energy provider through a supply-chain update to SCADA management software, then moves laterally for 47 days, mapping grid topology and exfiltrating operational procedures.

When they trigger the payload, substations across three counties lose supervisory control at once. Recovery takes 11 days because backup configurations were stored on network-attached storage, also compromised.

The path

Always there

What the attacker needs

A foothold and time

Play it through

An illustrative scenario.

Layer 1

Control over critical data paths

Offline

Configurations and recovery copies

9

Governance modules enforcing policy

Logged

Evidence for NIS2 and the CAF

Where each Control module is deployed across IT, OT, vendors and field sites.

Critical infrastructure operators carry a corporate estate, an OT core that runs the mission, a vendor zone that supports the kit and remote field sites that report into it. Control puts a real boundary at every step.

1. Every zone boundaryIsolateEvery zone sits on its own physical fabric.
2. L5 to L4 link and vendor linkFirebreakA physical cut on the public and vendor boundaries.
3. Vendor linkRelayVendor connections exist for the window of work and not a minute more.
4. Vendor linkUnlinkWhen a vendor relationship ends, Unlink removes the persistent connection and the inherited trust.
5. L5 to L4 link and inside the vendor linkValidateRequests crossing into trusted estates are checked for origin, integrity and authority.
6. Vendor link and L1 to L0 linkLockAccess ties to named individuals with the right authority.
7. Inside the vendor link and L2 to L1 linkExecutePushing a change holds until the right approval is in place.

Explore the Control Blueprints

From first boundary to routine operation.

Four steps, piloted on one site before it extends across the estate.

1. 1

   Threat and compliance assessment

   Map your infrastructure against NIS2 Article 21 and NCSC CAF outcomes.

2. 2

   Sovereign architecture design

   Select and configure Control modules for your sector: energy, water, transport or defence.

3. 3

   Controlled pilot

   Deploy in an isolated CNI environment with multi-party authorisation and tamper-evident logging.

4. 4

   Operational go-live

   Full deployment across critical infrastructure, with verified safe-state restoration.

Explore more

Where to go next.

• Control for OT environments
• Control for utilities
• Control for water
• CP-05 Protect Critical Infrastructure
• Control Blueprints
• Control by industry

• Isolate
• Firebreak
• Relay
• Unlink
• Validate

Speak to the team to organise a PoC.

Walk through your blueprint with the Firevault team and scope a proof of concept on your estate. 30 minutes, no sales pitch.