Challenge 1
Persistent privileged access.
Administrators keep always-on access, and their credentials can reach sensitive infrastructure through paths that never close.

Control for insider threat
Insider threats exploit the persistent connectivity organisations grant to trusted users. When access paths are physically removed outside operational windows, misuse needs a named, authorised and recorded window to work in.
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The challenge
Detection struggles with an insider who has legitimate access. Removing the path when it is not needed changes what an insider can do.
Paths to sensitive systems open for the operational window and close outside it.
Sensitive access needs approval from more than one authorised person.
Session activity is recorded and held on physically disconnected storage.
Challenge 1
Administrators keep always-on access, and their credentials can reach sensitive infrastructure through paths that never close.

Challenge 2
Insider actions appear legitimate because they use authorised credentials.
Answered byMulti-party authorisationChallenge 3
Insiders work slowly, and by the time they are detected, the damage is already extensive.

The scenario
The only thing that would have stopped it was removing the path entirely when it was not needed. Step through it, or play it through.
Step 1 of 2
A financial services database administrator, passed over for promotion, exports customer records in small batches over four weeks.
Each batch stays under data loss prevention thresholds, so nothing alerts.
Step 2 of 2
With Control, the database path is severed outside business hours.
Access during business hours requires multi-party authorisation through the Lock module, so every sensitive movement is a named, authorised, evidenced event.
An illustrative scenario.
Where Control breaks the chain
Control turns every sensitive movement into a named, authorised, evidenced event, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques T1078, T1567 and T1485 and to CERT Insider Threat Center patterns. Trust is preserved without becoming a single point of failure.
Capabilities
Six things Control gives the team, from the first boundary to the audit afterwards.
Insider threat
Paths to sensitive systems open for the operational window and close outside it.
Insider threat
Sensitive access needs approval from more than one authorised person.
Insider threat
Session activity is recorded and held on physically disconnected storage.
Insider threat
Credentials alone do not open a path that is physically severed.
Insider threat
Access exists as a named window rather than a standing right.
Insider threat
A record of who opened which path, when and for what, ready for review.
Adoption guide
Four steps, piloted on one site before it extends across the estate.
Map every privileged account and the always-on paths it can reach.
Define the operational windows and the approvals each sensitive path needs.
Deploy on one sensitive system, with windows, multi-party approval and recording.
Extend across sensitive systems, with continuous evidence.
Explore more
Questions
Work happens inside the operational window, as it does today. Outside the window, the path is severed.
A sensitive session opens only when more than one authorised person approves it, and the approval is recorded with the session.
Session records are held on physically disconnected storage, apart from the systems an insider works on.
An emergency window can be opened as a named, approved event, recorded like any other.

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