Control BlueprintCP-07
Protect Aviation and Aerospace Networks
Ground operations need supplier support and data exchange without giving every incoming connection a route to aviation systems.
- Blueprint
- CP-07
- Primary modules
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Firebreak
Isolate
Validate
Relay
- Supporting
-
Lock
Archive
Execute
- Where it fits
- Aerospace, aviation and MRO ground networks with air-lock ingress control
Firebreak
Validate
Relay
Isolate
Execute
Lock
Held offlineAirworthiness evidence vaultSigned logs of every air-lock cycle, software load and configuration change held offline for the airworthiness and regulator record.OfflineOut-of-band command pathManagement Ethernet, cellular SMS or an authenticated API, off the production network.
The sequenceStep through how the modules work together, as the Blueprint sets them out.
The pattern
Control incoming reach to ground and MRO operations.
- What it does
-
CP-07 uses a controlled ingress window between external services and aviation operations. Requests are validated before the temporary crossing opens. Ground and MRO environments remain separated from incoming reach outside the approved engagement.
Aviation sites cannot assume every operational area has continuous access to central security orchestration. Agree local enforcement and the human authority around it before deployment. The pattern concerns ground and MRO networks; it is not a claim that disconnecting a link is safe for every aviation system.
- Where it fits
-
For airport IT, airline ground systems, maintenance benches and connected airfield equipment. The operating context includes dispatch, scanners, baggage handling, fuelling and landing-light control, with the consequences of each boundary agreed by the responsible team.
- Who uses it
-
- Aerospace
- Aviation
- Defence
- MRO and ground operations
- Airport IT
- Grounded in
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EASA Part-IS, FAA InfoSec Handbook 1370.121, ICAO Doc 8973 and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 5.1. Control can help support the controls they describe.
Zone by zone
How CP-07 protects aviation and aerospace networks.
Work from the external supplier through the controlled ingress point to the specific ground environment approved for access.
- Zone 0
External and vendor
Vendors and external services request access to a defined support or exchange task, rather than receiving general aviation-estate reach.
- Boundary 1
Window only
Validate the request before opening a time-bound ingress window through the controlled air-lock.
FirebreakPhysical sever. Primary in CP-07
ValidateIntegrity check. Primary in CP-07
RelayTime-bound path. Primary in CP-07
- Zone 1
Aviation air-lock
The aviation air-lock is the approved landing point for incoming work, separated from the wider ground estate.
- Boundary 2
Severed
Limit onward reach to the ground or maintenance systems named in the engagement, closing it when the window ends.
IsolateZone boundary. Primary in CP-07
ExecuteTrigger, act, terminate. Supporting in CP-07
LockNamed access. Supporting in CP-07
- Zone 2
Ground and MRO operations
MRO benches and ground operations have different tasks and dependencies. Their required operation determines the scope of separation.
- Offline
Airworthiness evidence vault
Protect selected maintenance and airworthiness records separately offline for authorised review; the organisation retains responsibility for their validity and retention.
Offline Secure Storage®
Bill of modules
Firebreak, Isolate, Validate and Relay lead. Lock, Archive and Execute support.
The ingress modules establish the controlled window. Identity, retained records and the agreed local response support operational accountability.
| Module | Layer | In CP-07 | Where it sits | What it does here |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Control the path | Primary | Boundary 1 | Disconnects the selected incoming route to the aviation operational environment. | |
| Control the path | Primary | Boundary 2 | Separates external-facing access from ground and MRO systems with distinct operational responsibilities. | |
| Protect the asset | Primary | Boundary 1 | Checks the authority and purpose of the aviation support or data-exchange request. | |
| Control the path | Primary | Boundary 1 | Opens the aviation ingress window only for the approved engagement. | |
| Protect the asset | Supporting | Boundary 2 | Restricts access to the person and role permitted to work on the named ground systems. | |
| Protect the asset | Supporting | Across the Blueprint | Preserves relevant engagement and maintenance records for later review. | |
| Control the path | Supporting | Boundary 2 | Applies the locally approved response when the aviation boundary needs to close. |
Firebreak® is supplied by Firevault within Control for the selected aviation ingress crossing. Operational owners must validate the consequences of closing that crossing.Explore Firebreak®
Versus the alternatives
Incoming access should be an operational permission.
Keep monitoring and existing aviation procedures. Compare how incoming support reaches the ground systems, and who can end that reach.
| Question | Detect and respond | Manual shutdown | CP-07 |
|---|---|---|---|
| External request | Monitoring assesses activity on available paths | Staff connect the support link | Validate checks the named aviation engagement |
| Ingress duration | Expiry depends on existing access arrangements | The connection ends when staff remove it | Relay defines the approved ingress window |
| Ground-system scope | Software policy separates permitted services | One cable break may not match the operational zone | Isolate reflects the ground or MRO boundary |
| Local response | Central orchestration depends on site connectivity | A local person carries out the intervention | Execute applies the response authorised for that boundary |
| Maintenance evidence | Records depend on the maintenance and logging tools | A physical intervention needs separate documentation | Archive retains designated engagement records |
| Safety responsibility | Detection does not assess every operational dependency | Manual disconnection also needs operational approval | Ground-system owners validate the permitted closure |
Questions
Questions for aviation network owners.
This sheet concerns aviation ground, aerospace and MRO networks. It does not establish suitability for flight-control systems or authorise a safety-critical disconnection.
The ground systems affected by incoming support or data exchange, including dispatch, scanners, baggage handling, fuelling and connected airfield equipment. Assess each system’s operational dependencies separately.
It provides a controlled ingress point. The request is validated, the approved window opens and onward reach is limited to the named engagement rather than becoming a permanent external path.
The design can provide pre-agreed local enforcement. Specify the authorised signals, out-of-band control arrangements and human decision owner for the operational area.
At the expiry of the authorised work or earlier on an agreed termination signal. Define who approves extensions and what records must be retained before the engagement is considered closed.
No. Separately protected records support retention and review. Their validity, regulatory purpose and any airworthiness determination remain with the responsible aviation organisation.
Disconnect to Protect®
Give ground operations a controlled front door.
Tell us which external services reach your ground or MRO networks. We will discuss the ingress windows and operational boundaries.



