Challenge 1
Safety system tampering.
Attackers who reach safety instrumented systems can turn a cyber incident into a process-safety incident.

Control for oil and gas
Control physically governs every network path into safety instrumented systems and DCS/SCADA environments, so access exists only when it is authorised. In oil and gas, a compromised control system is a potential safety incident, not just a data breach.
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The challenge
Safety system tampering, ransomware on the DCS, remote wellhead intrusion and persistent vendor access all depend on a path being there.
Process configurations and recovery sets held in secured Firevault Bunkers.
Contractor access and logic changes need sign-off from both operations and HSE.
Logging that can help support IEC 62443 and NIS2 evidence.
Challenge 1
Attackers who reach safety instrumented systems can turn a cyber incident into a process-safety incident.

Challenge 2
Ransomware that reaches the distributed control system can halt a facility.
Answered byOperations and HSE sign-offChallenge 3
Contractor VPNs and remote wellhead links are often left active between maintenance visits.

The scenario
A contractor VPN left active between maintenance visits is a standing route to the DCS. Step through it, or play it through.
Step 1 of 2
An attacker uses a contractor’s VPN, left active between maintenance visits, to reach a refinery DCS network.
They alter controller logic, with the safety instrumented system next in line.
Step 2 of 2
With Control, the contractor path is physically severed between maintenance windows.
The DCS and SIS sit behind their own boundaries, and DCS baselines, PLC programs and SIS logic are held offline in Offline Secure Storage® as recovery sets.
An illustrative scenario.
Where each module sits
A Purdue stack from the internet (L5) down to field devices and safety systems (L0 and SIS), with Control at each boundary. Referenced standards include IEC 62443, API Standard 1164 and the TSA Pipeline Security Directives.
Capabilities
Six things Control gives the team, from the first boundary to the audit afterwards.
Oil and gas
Process configurations and recovery sets held in secured Firevault Bunkers.
Oil and gas
Contractor access and logic changes need sign-off from both operations and HSE.
Oil and gas
Logging that can help support IEC 62443 and NIS2 evidence.
Oil and gas
Out-of-band management for remote sites, independent of the operational network.
Oil and gas
Every access, change and command is recorded.
Oil and gas
Verified baselines of safety configuration support restoration after an incident.
Adoption guide
Four steps, piloted on one site before it extends across the estate.
Map every path into the DCS, SCADA and safety systems, including contractor and remote links.
Design zones and conduits with Control modules at each boundary.
Deploy at one facility with contractor windows, dual sign-off and offline recovery sets.
Extend across facilities and remote sites.
Explore more
Questions
No. Control governs the paths into the SIS, so safety logic runs as it does today, behind its own boundary.
Through a time-bound window that opens with operations and HSE sign-off, and closes again afterwards.
Remote links are governed like any other path, with out-of-band management over satellite where needed.

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