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Oil and Gas

Control Path Protection for Upstream, Midstream, and Refinery

Oil and gas operations span remote wellheads, offshore platforms, pipelines, and refineries. Each environment runs safety-critical control systems that must remain isolated from corporate networks and external threats.

Back to Control
Control

Oil and Gas

In oil and gas, a compromised control system is not a data breach. It is a potential safety incident with consequences measured in lives, environmental damage, and billions in liability.

100%

DCS and SIS isolation from corporate IT

Zero

Persistent vendor paths to safety systems

5

Operational zones with independent governance

Full

IEC 62443 and NIS2 compliance evidence

The Challenge

Oil and gas face converging cyber-physical risks.

Safety System Exposure

Safety instrumented systems increasingly share network infrastructure with DCS and business systems, creating paths to the last line of defence against catastrophic events.

Remote Operations

Offshore platforms and remote wellheads rely on satellite and radio communications for control, with limited visibility into who is accessing what.

Contractor Access

Dozens of specialist contractors require access to different control systems, each creating persistent pathways that outlive the maintenance window.

The Scenario

Scenario: Refinery DCS Compromise via Contractor VPN

Attackers compromise a control system integrator through a targeted phishing campaign. Using the integrator's VPN credentials, they access the refinery DCS network through a maintenance connection that was left active between scheduled visits. Over three weeks, they map the process control network and deploy modified logic on key programmable controllers. When activated, the modified logic causes a distillation column to operate outside safe parameters. The safety instrumented system should intervene, but its engineering workstation was reachable from the same network segment. With Firevault Control, the contractor VPN path is physically severed between maintenance windows. The SIS exists on a separate, disconnected network. The attack cannot reach safety systems because the path does not exist.

"We had 23 active contractor VPN tunnels into our DCS network. When we audited them, seven belonged to contractors whose projects had ended more than a year ago. The tunnels were still live."

Module deployment · oil and gas network

Where each Control module is deployed across SCADA, DCS and safety.

Oil and gas operators run a corporate estate, SCADA across pipelines and terminals, DCS at process plants and SIS at the safety layer. Control puts a real boundary between each layer.

Grounded in IEC 62443-3-2, API Standard 1164 and TSA Pipeline Security Directives.

L5

Internet / Cloud

External

Cloud services
FirebreakValidate

External traffic stops at the perimeter.

L4

Enterprise

IT

ERP
Email
SOC / SIEM
IsolateFirebreak

Office estate has no path into SCADA on its own.

L3.5

Industrial DMZ

DMZ · trust boundary

Jump server
Patch & AV
Data broker
RelayValidate

Data crosses the DMZ on controlled routes only.

L3

Operations

OT

Historian
Engineering
Isolate

Engineering and SCADA on separate fabrics.

L2

Supervisory

OT

Pipeline SCADA
DCS HMI
Execute

Control changes require approval before they move.

L1

Basic control

Field

DCS controllers
PLCs
RTUs
IsolateLock

Safety sits behind its own boundary.

SIS

Safety systems

Field

Safety PLC
ESD
F&G

Safety integrity. Last line of defence.

Safety integrity. Last line of defence.

Lock

Field kit ties to named engineers.

L0

Physical

Field

Pumps
Valves
Sensors
OSS

Crown jewels

Off-network

Detail callout · A

Offline Secure Storage

DCS baselines, PLC programs, SIS logic, recipes and the recovery sets you need to rebuild from.

Offline by design · secure by default

Modules & symbols

FirebreakPhysical sever
ValidateIntegrity check
IsolateZone boundary
RelayTime-bound path
ExecuteApproved action
LockNamed access
DMZ boundaryTrust transition
OSS calloutOff-network detail

Where each module is deployed, and what it does there.

One row per module. Placement on the network, then plain-English purpose at that point.

  1. Isolate

    At every Purdue boundary

    Each layer sits on its own physical fabric. A compromise in one does not walk into the next.

  2. Firebreak

    On the L5 to L4 link and the L4 to L3.5 link

    Real hardware off switches on the public and office boundaries, cutting the live path into operations when needed.

  3. Validate

    On the L5 to L4 link and inside the L3.5 DMZ

    Before data feeds operations, Validate checks its origin and integrity. A spoofed reading does not become a process action.

  4. Relay

    Inside the L3.5 DMZ

    Telemetry and operational data land inside a defined route. Nothing streams unattended.

  5. Execute

    On the L2 to L1 link

    Pushing a change to a controller holds until the right approval is in place.

  6. Lock

    On the L1 to SIS link and the SIS to L0 link

    Safety and field access ties to named engineers with the right authority and the right device.

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Key Capabilities

Sovereign Process Data

All process control configurations and safety system logic remain within the agreed jurisdiction in NATO-approved Firevault Bunkers.

Multi-Party Access Control

Contractor and vendor access requires sign-off from both operations and HSE teams before any path is activated.

IEC 62443 Evidence

Automated compliance logging maps directly to IEC 62443 zone and conduit requirements and NIS2 Article 21 outcomes.

Satellite Failover

Out-of-band management ensures control plane access to offshore and remote facilities independent of primary communications.

Tamper-Proof Logging

Every contractor session, configuration change, and access authorisation is recorded in immutable logs on physically separate infrastructure.

Verified Safety Configuration Baselines

Verified baselines of SIS logic and safety configuration enable restoration of control-plane state during total compromise scenarios.

Demo to Live

Adoption Guide

Step 1

Process Network Assessment

Map all network paths between corporate IT, DCS, SIS, and contractor access points across upstream, midstream, and downstream operations.

Step 2

Zone and Conduit Design

Design physically separated zones aligned to IEC 62443 requirements with Control modules governing each conduit between zones.

Step 3

Single Facility Pilot

Deploy at one facility with full zone separation, contractor access governance, and compliance logging to validate operational procedures.

Step 4

Enterprise Rollout

Phased deployment across all facilities with verified configuration baselines, continuous compliance evidence, and out-of-band management.

Step 1

Process Network Assessment

Map all network paths between corporate IT, DCS, SIS, and contractor access points across upstream, midstream, and downstream operations.

Step 2

Zone and Conduit Design

Design physically separated zones aligned to IEC 62443 requirements with Control modules governing each conduit between zones.

Step 3

Single Facility Pilot

Deploy at one facility with full zone separation, contractor access governance, and compliance logging to validate operational procedures.

Step 4

Enterprise Rollout

Phased deployment across all facilities with verified configuration baselines, continuous compliance evidence, and out-of-band management.

Questions

Frequently Asked

Oil and Gas blueprint

Speak to the team to organise a PoC

Walk through your blueprint with the Firevault team and scope a proof of concept on your estate. 30 minutes, no sales pitch.

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    Oil And Gas

    Physical path control for oil and gas SCADA, refineries, and pipelines. Contain ransomware and govern vendor access without disrupting operations.

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