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Threat Response

Secure IT/OT Convergence Through Physical Boundary Enforcement

Convergence delivers operational efficiency but destroys the air gap that protected industrial systems for decades. Firevault Control restores the physical boundary while preserving the data flows that convergence enables.

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Control

Threat Response

You cannot firewall your way to an air gap. If a packet can traverse from your IT network to your OT environment, the boundary exists only in your network diagram, not in reality.

91%

Of OT environments now have some IT network connectivity

Zero

Persistent IT-to-OT network paths during production

Physical

Separation between IT and OT management planes

Full

IEC 62443 zone and conduit compliance evidence

The Threat

Convergence creates pathways that industrial systems were never designed to defend.

Eroded Air Gaps

The physical separation that protected OT systems for decades has been replaced with firewalls and VLANs. These logical controls are bypassed through misconfigurations, credential theft, and zero-day vulnerabilities.

Legacy System Exposure

Industrial control systems running decades-old software are now reachable from IT networks. These systems cannot be patched, cannot run endpoint protection, and were never designed for network-connected operation.

Shared Management Planes

IT and OT often share authentication infrastructure, jump servers, and management tools. A compromise of the IT management plane provides direct access to OT control systems.

The Scenario

Scenario: IT Compromise Reaching Industrial Control Systems

A water treatment facility connects its SCADA systems to the corporate IT network for remote monitoring and reporting. An attacker compromises a corporate workstation through a phishing email and discovers the jump server used for SCADA access. Using harvested credentials, they traverse from the IT network to the OT environment, gaining access to programmable logic controllers that manage chemical dosing. With Firevault Control, the IT-to-OT boundary is physically enforced. Data flows from OT to IT for monitoring occur through the Transfer module during scheduled windows, but there is no persistent path from IT into the OT environment. The jump server is physically disconnected from OT infrastructure outside authorised maintenance windows.

"We had a firewall between IT and OT with 47 rules. Our penetration testers traversed it in 3 hours. The only separation that would have stopped them was physical disconnection."

IT-to-OT crossover

How Control stops IT incidents bleeding into OT.

IT and OT convergence is efficient, but it gives an IT compromise a direct road into safety-critical control systems. Firevault Control keeps the convergence operational without letting an IT incident become a process-safety incident.

Mapped to ATT&CK for ICS tactics (TA0108 Initial Access, TA0109 Execution, TA0106 Lateral Movement, TA0107 Inhibit Response Function) and IEC 62443 zone and conduit requirements.

  1. ST 01

    IT Foothold

    TA0001

    ◤ Attacker

    Compromises a corporate endpoint or engineering workstation that also has a path into the OT network.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    The conduit between IT and OT is physically severed unless an authorised operational window is open.

    FirebreakIsolate
    ✕ Break here
  2. ST 02

    Crossover Attempt

    TA0108

    ◤ Attacker

    Uses jump hosts, historians or engineering tooling to step across the IT-OT boundary.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    Cross-zone access becomes a named Relay session with explicit approval, scope and time limit.

    RelayLockValidate
    ✕ Break here
  3. ST 03

    OT Reconnaissance

    TA0102

    ◤ Attacker

    Enumerates PLCs, RTUs and HMIs to understand the process before acting.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    Discovery is contained within the level the session was scoped to. Field zones are not reachable as a side effect.

    Isolate
    ✕ Break here
  4. ST 04

    Inhibit Safety Response

    TA0107

    ◤ Attacker

    Tries to disable interlocks, alarms or safety instrumented systems so a destructive command can land.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    Safety-related changes require Execute with multi-party approval. The safety instrumented system stays beyond casual reach.

    ExecuteValidateLock

Outcome · outcome block

An IT compromise stays in IT. The operational process keeps running and the safety layer is never quietly disarmed.

Modules & symbols

FirebreakPhysical sever
IsolateZone boundary
RelayTime-bound path
LockNamed access
ValidateIntegrity check
ExecuteApproved action
✕
Break hereChain severed by Firevault
◤
Attacker stepMITRE ATT&CK tactic

Featured In

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Key Capabilities

Physical Boundary Enforcement

The IT/OT boundary is enforced through physical disconnection, not firewall rules. No misconfiguration, credential theft, or zero-day can bypass a path that does not exist.

One-Way Data Diodes

Monitoring data flows from OT to IT through controlled transfer mechanisms that prevent any return path from IT into the OT environment.

Separate Management Planes

IT and OT management infrastructure exists on physically separate networks. Compromise of IT management systems provides no path to OT control systems.

Emergency OT Isolation

A single authorised command physically severs all IT/OT connections, allowing OT systems to continue safe operation while the IT compromise is contained.

Conduit Activity Logging

Every data transfer and maintenance session across the IT/OT boundary is logged on physically disconnected storage for compliance and forensic purposes.

IEC 62443 Compliance

Physical zone and conduit architecture maps directly to IEC 62443 requirements, with automated evidence generation for audit and certification.

Demo to Live

Adoption Guide

Step 1

Convergence Point Audit

Map every connection between IT and OT environments, including shared management infrastructure, jump servers, historian links, and vendor access paths.

Step 2

Zone and Conduit Design

Design physically separated zones aligned to the Purdue model with controlled conduits for each authorised data flow and maintenance path.

Step 3

Non-Critical System Pilot

Deploy physical boundary enforcement on a non-critical OT segment, testing monitoring data flows, maintenance windows, and emergency isolation procedures.

Step 4

Full OT Deployment

Extend to all IT/OT boundaries with automated compliance evidence generation, continuous conduit monitoring, and integration with existing SCADA management.

Step 1

Convergence Point Audit

Map every connection between IT and OT environments, including shared management infrastructure, jump servers, historian links, and vendor access paths.

Step 2

Zone and Conduit Design

Design physically separated zones aligned to the Purdue model with controlled conduits for each authorised data flow and maintenance path.

Step 3

Non-Critical System Pilot

Deploy physical boundary enforcement on a non-critical OT segment, testing monitoring data flows, maintenance windows, and emergency isolation procedures.

Step 4

Full OT Deployment

Extend to all IT/OT boundaries with automated compliance evidence generation, continuous conduit monitoring, and integration with existing SCADA management.

Questions

Frequently Asked

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    It Ot Convergence

    Physically govern IT/OT convergence so a compromise on one side cannot spread to the other. Architecture-level containment for industrial estates.

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