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Water

Treatment Plant and Distribution SCADA Path Control

Water treatment and distribution systems directly affect public health. When control systems are compromised, attackers can alter chemical dosing, disrupt supply, or contaminate drinking water for entire populations.

Back to Control

Key threats addressed

SCADA compromiseChemical dosing tamperingRansomwareThird-party vendor accessIT to OT lateral movement

Overview

A real boundary between corporate IT and the chemistry of public water.

Water infrastructure presents attackers with the opportunity for catastrophic physical harm. Firevault Control uses physical isolation to render treatment SCADA, dosing controllers and distribution telemetry unreachable from corporate IT and the wider internet. Fast to deploy, non-disruptive, and fully aligned to NIS2, DWI and Ofwat expectations, with immutable evidence ready for audit.

Water

When a water treatment control system is reachable from the corporate network, every phishing email becomes a potential path to altering the chemical composition of a city's drinking water.

100%

Treatment SCADA isolation from corporate IT

Zero

Persistent remote access to dosing systems

5

Operational zones with independent governance

Full

NIS2 and DWI compliance evidence

The Challenge

Water infrastructure faces direct public health threats.

Chemical Dosing Risks

Compromised control systems could alter chlorine dosing or pH levels in treatment processes, directly threatening public health on a massive scale.

Remote Pumping Stations

Hundreds of remote pumping stations and reservoirs rely on SCADA communications with limited local security, creating distributed entry points.

IT/OT Convergence

Smart water network modernisation creates network paths between corporate IT and operational technology that attackers can traverse.

Pain points

  • Software-only defences can be bypassed by zero-day exploits targeting SCADA systems.
  • Third-party SCADA vendor access creates persistent connectivity risks.
  • Chemical treatment and pump control systems require strict access governance.
  • NIS2, DWI and Ofwat security expectations require demonstrable segmentation and resilience.

The Scenario

Scenario: Water Treatment SCADA Compromise

Attackers compromise a water company's corporate network through a targeted phishing campaign against the finance department. They move laterally until they reach a historian server that bridges the IT and OT networks. From there, they access the treatment plant SCADA system and modify chemical dosing parameters for chlorine and fluoride. The changes are subtle enough to avoid immediate alarm triggers but sufficient to affect water quality across the distribution area. With Firevault Control, the treatment SCADA network is physically disconnected from corporate IT. The historian server operates in a controlled zone with authorised, time-limited data transfer to corporate systems. The attack path from finance workstations to dosing controls does not exist.

"The historian server was our biggest vulnerability. It sat on both the IT and OT networks because the business needed water quality data in their dashboards. It was the bridge that gave attackers a direct path from email to the chlorine dosing system."

Module deployment · water utility network

Where each Control module is deployed across treatment and distribution.

Water companies run the same Purdue stack as power, with telemetry reaching every treatment plant, reservoir and pumping station. Control puts a real boundary between the office, the telemetry network and the SCADA that moves and treats the water.

Grounded in NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, EPA Water Sector cybersecurity guidance and NIS2 Annex I.

L5

Cloud / Internet

External

Customer portal
Cloud services
FirebreakValidate

Public traffic stops in the DMZ.

L4

Enterprise

IT

SOC
SIEM
Billing

Office, billing, customer services.

Office, billing, customer services.

IsolateFirebreak

Office cannot reach the plant on its own.

L3.5

Industrial DMZ

DMZ · trust boundary

Jump server
Patch & AV
Telemetry broker

Brokered exchange. No straight-through paths into the plant.

Brokered exchange. No straight-through paths into the plant.

RelayValidate

Telemetry lands on a defined route only.

L3

Operations systems

OT

Historian
Engineering workstation
Isolate

Engineering and SCADA on separate fabrics.

L2

Supervisory control

OT

Treatment SCADA
Distribution SCADA

Control room view of treatment and the network.

Control room view of treatment and the network.

Execute

Treatment changes are approved before they move.

L1

Basic control

Field

PLCs
RTUs
Dosing controllers
Lock

Field kit ties to named engineers.

L0

Physical

Field

Pumps
Valves
Sensors
OSS

Crown jewels

Off-network

Detail callout · A

Offline Secure Storage

Treatment recipes, plant configurations, distribution network maps and the recovery sets you need after an incident.

Offline by design · secure by default

Modules & symbols

FirebreakPhysical sever
ValidateIntegrity check
IsolateZone boundary
RelayTime-bound path
ExecuteApproved action
LockNamed access
DMZ boundaryTrust transition
OSS calloutOff-network detail

Where each module is deployed, and what it does there.

One row per module. Placement on the network, then plain-English purpose at that point.

  1. Isolate

    At every Purdue boundary

    Office, telemetry, treatment and distribution sit on separate physical fabrics. A compromise on the corporate side cannot reach the plants.

  2. Firebreak

    On the L5 to L4 link and the L4 to L3.5 link

    A real hardware off switch on the public and office boundaries, cutting the live path between corporate and the treatment plants.

  3. Validate

    On the L5 to L4 link and inside the L3.5 DMZ

    Before any reading or request reaches operations, Validate checks its origin and integrity. A spoofed telemetry value does not become a chemical dose.

  4. Relay

    Inside the L3.5 DMZ

    Sensor and pump data flows into SCADA on a scheduled, controlled route. Outside that route, telemetry cannot reach into control.

  5. Execute

    On the L2 to L1 link

    Cross-plant actions need the right approval and the right state. Single clicks do not move treatment kit.

  6. Lock

    On the L1 to L0 link

    Field devices tie to named engineers, the right device and the right authority.

Featured In

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Key Capabilities

Sovereign Water Data

All treatment and distribution control data remains within the agreed jurisdiction in secured Firevault Bunkers, meeting Ofwat and DWI requirements.

Multi-Party Process Control

Changes to treatment parameters require authorisation from both operations and water quality teams, preventing unilateral modifications.

DWI and NIS2 Evidence

Automated compliance logging maps directly to Drinking Water Inspectorate requirements and NIS2 Article 21 outcomes for water companies.

Cellular SCADA Failover

Out-of-band management via cellular connectivity ensures control over treatment systems independent of primary communications infrastructure.

Process Change Audit

Every dosing parameter change, valve operation, and access authorisation is recorded in tamper-proof logs for DWI and regulatory audit.

Safe State Recovery

Verified baselines of treatment configuration enable rapid restoration to known-safe operating parameters during compromise scenarios.

Demo to Live

Adoption Guide

Step 1

Water Network Assessment

Map all network paths between corporate IT, treatment SCADA, distribution SCADA, water quality systems, and remote pumping stations.

Step 2

Treatment Zone Design

Design physically separated zones for treatment, distribution, quality monitoring, and corporate systems with Control modules at each boundary.

Step 3

Single Works Pilot

Deploy at one treatment works with full SCADA isolation, multi-party process authorisation, and compliance logging to validate operational procedures.

Step 4

Company-Wide Deployment

Phased deployment across all treatment works and pumping stations with verified configuration baselines, continuous compliance evidence, and cellular management.

Step 1

Water Network Assessment

Map all network paths between corporate IT, treatment SCADA, distribution SCADA, water quality systems, and remote pumping stations.

Step 2

Treatment Zone Design

Design physically separated zones for treatment, distribution, quality monitoring, and corporate systems with Control modules at each boundary.

Step 3

Single Works Pilot

Deploy at one treatment works with full SCADA isolation, multi-party process authorisation, and compliance logging to validate operational procedures.

Step 4

Company-Wide Deployment

Phased deployment across all treatment works and pumping stations with verified configuration baselines, continuous compliance evidence, and cellular management.

Questions

Frequently Asked

Water blueprint - PoC

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